Iran's pivot towards Russia and China in recent years and the two behemoths' increasing presence in the Middle East portend costly outcomes for security across the region, analysts say.

Iran has become increasingly reliant on China -- its largest trade partner -- in the face of political and economic crises, diplomatic isolation and regional tensions, The Iran Primer, a project of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), reported August 1.

Beijing's footprint in the region peaked in March when it brokered a surprise rapprochement deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

"China is trying to translate its economic power into political power," Nasser Hadian, a political scientist at the University of Tehran, told The Iran Primer.

Lopsided relationship with China

China's presence in the Middle East has been steadily growing over the past decade following the announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, but many "partners" are finding friendship with Beijing to be lopsided.

From outsized debt and murky loan agreements to failed or stalled BRI infrastructure projects and faulty military equipment, the cost of cooperation with China has been high.

While China's main focus has been on racking up BRI-connected economic investment deals in strategically positioned countries, mainly infrastructure and connectivity projects aimed to boost trade, observers say Beijing's motives have a dual purpose.

Beijing's "string of pearls" strategy is to link mainland China to the Horn of Africa via a network of military and commercial facilities, they point out.

China opened its first overseas military base in 2017 in Djibouti, reportedly to facilitate maritime operations around the Indian Ocean and East Africa. Beijing used the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and its desire to secure critical international sea lanes as justification.

Authorities in Beijing have used that same line of reasoning to make the case for a military base in western Africa as well.

When news broke late last year that China was secretly building a military base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), alarm bells rang throughout the region and beyond.

Hidden costs

In recent years, China has built commercial port facilities in Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka and other key areas that could be used by its rapidly expanding navy.

Beijing also has attempted to push inferior military equipment through the BRI to mixed results.

"China attracts customers for its military equipment with cut-rate pricing and financing, but there are hidden costs -- especially when gear malfunctions," a RAND analysis published June 8 said.

Some of the problems include countries' technological incompatibility with Chinese military equipment, lack of personnel with the expertise and training to resolve issues, and difficulty acquiring spare parts, the RAND report said.

Pakistan, for example, is the largest importer of Chinese military equipment and Chinese private security contractors (PSCs), many of whom are stationed around key portions of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Pakistani component of the BRI.

But Pakistan has "expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese-produced F-22P frigates, including technical issues, engine degradation, and poor overall performance," according to RAND.

"Pakistan also found that the onboard imaging device of the FM90 (N) missile system had a defective infrared sensor (IR17) system and SR-60 radars," it said.

As a result, the missile system was unable to lock onto targets and the sensors had to be discarded altogether.

As for CPEC, many Pakistanis view the decade-long infrastructure drive as harmful to their country and beneficial to China.

Residents of Balochistan, Pakistan's poorest province despite an abundance of natural resources, are seething with resentment, as the Chinese project is delivering less than promised benefits while plundering local resources.

Local militant groups have tapped into the sentiment that Chinese investment under CPEC has not benefited locals, attacking infrastructure projects and Chinese workers in Pakistan multiple times in recent years.

Subpar reputation for quality

Meanwhile in Africa, Chinese military equipment sales "appear driven by profit and trying to grab market share from Russia," according to RAND.

"If a country worries its human rights records, financial credibility, or regime stability might harm its eligibility to purchase military equipment from Western suppliers, China is always an option," it said.

China's main customers are developing countries, with its largest customers of weapons and PSCs in South Asia and Africa, according to a RAND report covering the years 2018–2021. It also has customers in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.

"Soft power and image-building are China's major motivators in these regions, setting the foundation for ties in the same way that its Belt and Road infrastructure projects do," the report said.

That said, China's "subpar reputation for quality" appears to be harming sales.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released data in March showing a 23% decrease in China's arms exports between the four-year periods of 2013–17 and 2018–22.

Risky business

Iran is also leaning on Russia and its military cooperation with Moscow has expanded notably since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Middle East Institute (MEI) reported June 1.

One of the reasons Tehran wants to tighten its cooperation with Russia is "to draw on Moscow's potential political and intelligence assistance during the transition period to the third supreme leader of Iran," the report said.

But relying on Russia comes with various perils, given its own international isolation following the war in Ukraine, where Russian troops are accused of carrying out war crimes, prompting draconian sanctions on the Kremlin and its allies.

Russia has also proven to be an unreliable partner for Iran. Despite the highly anticipated and heavily touted deal that the Iranian regime struck with Moscow earlier this year, Russia will not deliver Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) aircraft to Iran after all, Iranian media outlets reported in July.

Syria and Yemen are prime examples of what loyalties to Iran or Russia can bring to a country: both countries have been in a constant state of turmoil for the better part of a decade.

Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthis, has been in a protracted civil war since 2014.

The Syrian civil war, meanwhile, has been ongoing since 2011. Russia intervened on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in September 2015, and Russian troops are accused of committing war crimes and of deliberately targeting civilians in that conflict as well.

Iran, meanwhile, has its own ambitions in Syria, which it sees as a key corridor for its presence in the Levant. Both Iran and Russia have been in a heated race for control over Syria, say analysts.

"By aligning with Russia and China in the security and commercial spheres, Iran feels it has acquired an insurance policy against any potential negative resolutions emanating from the United Nations Security Council," the MEI report said.

But as scrutiny of Russia's and China's military and financial dealings in the region increases, betting on Moscow, Beijing or Tehran is risky business.